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INTRODUCTION 
Imagine that a group of foreign registered nurses approaches you be-
cause they feel abused and want to quit their jobs.  They signed an em-
ployment contract with a $25,000 liquidated damage provision agreeing to 
remain employed for three years and are unsure of their rights.  You advise 
your clients that they have the right to quit, and after they act on this advice, 
you find yourself at the center of a massive criminal and civil controversy.  
Both you and your clients are criminally charged with endangering the wel-
fare of patients and related crimes because the nurses resigned en masse 
without notice.  This may seem strange in light of the Thirteenth Amend-
ment‘s ban on involuntary servitude, but in 2007, this happened to ten 
nurses and their lawyer.1 
There is a serious shortage of Registered Nurses in this country, and as 
a result, nurses are widely recruited from the Philippines to work in hospit-





  Adjunct Professor of Law, St. John‘s University School of Law and New York Law School; Se-
nior Counsel, New York State United Teachers; Editor, Adjunct Law Professor Blog, 
http://www.lawprofessors.typepad.com/adjunctprofs; B.S., Cornell University School of Industrial and 
Labor Relations; J.D. with distinction, Hofstra University School of Law.  The views expressed in this 
Essay are entirely the author‘s and may not necessarily represent the views of any organization that he is 
affiliated with.   
1
  See Indictment No. I-769A-K-07, People v. Vinluan, No. 00769a-2007 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. Mar. 22, 
2007) [hereinafter Vinluan Indictment], available at 
http://a1022.g.akamai.net/f/1022/8160/5m/images.newsday.com/media/acrobat/2007-10/33024601.pdf 
(link).  The registered nurses maintain a web site, http://www.s27plus.com (link), as well as a blog, 
http://www.justiceforsentosa27.blogspot.com (link).  Their plight has attracted attention in the media.  
See, e.g., Vesselin Mitev, Attorney Faces Criminal Charges After Clients Quit Their Nursing Jobs, 
LAW.COM, Feb. 27, 2008, http://www.law.com/jsp/law/LawArticleFriendly.jsp?id=1204026532354 
(link); Joseph Berger, Filipino Nurses, Healers in Trouble, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 27, 2008, §  LI, at 1 (link). 
2
  Jeff Miles, The Nursing Shortage: Wage-Information Sharing Among Competing Hospitals, and 
the Antitrust Laws: The Nurse Wages Antitrust Litigation, 7 HOUS. J. HEALTH L. & POL‘Y 305, 310 
(2007) (―There is unanimity of opinion that an RN shortage exists . . . .‖); Berger, supra note 1 (stating 
that Filipino nurses have become ―a mainstay of the New York area‘s hospitals and nursing homes‖). 
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workers from the Philippines working legally in the United States.  As part 
of their sponsorship, all had signed identical employment agreements.  
These contracts required the nurses to remain employed for three years and 
included a $25,000 liquidated damages provision.3 
After the nurses resigned on April 7, 2006, various legal proceedings 
involving the nurses and their attorney, Felix Vinluan, began.  Most nota-
bly, a claim of patient abandonment was filed with the New York State 
Education Department, which regulates the nursing profession, although 
that charge has since been dismissed.4  Nevertheless, a Grand Jury indicted 
the nurses on eleven counts of misdemeanor crimes, including endangering 
the welfare of pediatric patients.5  The indictment also charged their lawyer 
with conspiring to commit these crimes, alleging that he advised the nurses 
to resign en mass without notice.6  Significantly, the indictment does not al-
lege that any shift at the nursing home went uncovered or that any child was 
actually harmed as a result of the nurses‘ resignation.7 
In September of 2007, the court denied motions to dismiss for insuffi-
cient evidence filed by both Vinluan and the ten nurses.  With regard to 
Vinluan, the court emphasized the fact that the mass resignations could 





  Each of the nurses‘ contracts has identical language, except that different facilities contracted with 
each of the nurses.  Affidavit of James Druker, at ¶ 9, People v. Vinluan, No. 00769a-2007 (N.Y. Crim. 
Ct. May 21, 2007) [hereinafter Druker Affidavit] (on file with the Northwestern University Law Re-
view).  Specifically, the contract provided: 
20. The employee agrees to be employed by the Employer under the terms of this contract for 
three full years from his/her date of employment. . . . 
21. Both the Employer and Employee agree that the Employer has or will incur substantial ex-
penses and has or will expend enormous resources and time in recruiting the Employee for em-
ployment as contemplated herein, sponsoring the Employee for an Immigrant Visa, training the 
Employee in practice and procedures, and orienting the Employee to living in the New York area.  
In as much as the parties agree that damages would be difficult to calculate if the Employee will-
fully, voluntarily, and without reasonable cause terminates the agreement before the completion of 
the three (3) year term, the parties agree that such an act shall result in an obligation by the Em-
ployee to pay the Employer Twenty-Five Thousand Dollars ($25,000.00) as a liquidated damage 
penalty. . . . 
Id. at ex. B. 
4
  See Email from Daniel Kelleher, Director of Investigation, New York State Education Depart-
ment, to Felix Vinluan, the attorney representing the nurses (Sept. 13, 2006) (on file with the Northwes-
tern University Law Review); Email from Felix Vinluan, the attorney representing the nurses, to Daniel 
Kelleher, Director of Investigation, New York State Education Department (Sept. 9, 2006) (on file with 
the Northwestern University Law Review); see also Petition for a Writ of Prohibition Under Article 78 
¶ 59, People v. Vinluan, No. 2008-02568 (N.Y. App. Div. Mar. 18, 2008) [hereinafter Article 78 Peti-
tion]. 
5
  See Vinluan Indictment, supra note 1.  
6
  See id. at 5–7.  Mr. Vinluan asserts that he never counseled the nurses to resign, but that he ad-
vised them of their right to resign under the law.  See Mitev, supra note 1.   
7
  See Vinluan Indictment, supra note 1; see also Druker Affidavit, supra note 3, at ¶ 4. 
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were gravely ill.8  With regard to the nurses, the court rejected the claim that 
under the Thirteenth Amendment a person cannot be criminally punished 
for quitting her job.  The court interpreted the charges as not punishing the 
nurses for simply resigning, but because they resigned en masse, which the 
prosecution argued, endangered their patients.9  Vinluan and the nurses suc-
cessfully brought a proceeding to stay their criminal prosecutions pending a 
determination on whether the trial court correctly denied the motions to 
dismiss.10  On January 13, 2009, the Second Judicial Department of the Ap-
pellate Division reversed the lower courts and held that neither the nurses 
nor their attorney may be criminally prosecuted.11 
This Essay examines this troubling case and the public policy issues 
that it highlights.  Part I reviews the nature of employment contracts and 
concludes that the Thirteenth Amendment and related legislation prohibit 
enforcing the nurses‘ three-year time commitment through specific perfor-
mance.  Part II examines whether criminal prosecution of the nurses is 
preempted by the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA)12 and concludes 
that criminal prosecution is preempted because it interferes with the free 
play of economic forces that NLRA aims to protect.  Part III explores legal 
issues surrounding the criminal prosecution of an attorney based on advice 
he may have given.  The Essay concludes by explaining that the liquidated 
damage provision, which may have sparked this entire controversy, was 
probably unenforceable as a penalty, that the criminal prosecution was un-
warranted, and that the Appellate Division‘s decision was correct. 
I. INVOLUNTARY SERVITUDE & PEONAGE 
The prohibitions on involuntary servitude and slavery contained in the 
Thirteenth Amendment and related legislation apply to situations in which 





  People v. Vinluan, No. 00769A-2007, slip op. at 2–3 (Nassau Co. Sept. 27, 2007), available at 
http://www.co.suffolk.ny.us/da/press/2007/pdf/People%20v%20Felix%20Vinluan.pdf (link).  
9
  People v. Jacinto, Indictment No. 00769 (B-K)-07, slip op. at 2 (Nassau Co. Sept. 28, 2007), 
available at http://www.co.suffolk.ny.us/da/press/2007/pdf/People%20v%20Elmer%20Jacinto.pdf 
(link). 
10
  Vinluan v. Dolye, 2008 NY Slip Op 68098(U) (N.Y. App. Div. April 14, 2008), available at 
http://www.nycourts.gov/reporter/motions/2008/2008_69098.htm (link). 
One of the nursing homes also brought a breach of contract action against three of the nurses and a 
claim for tortious interference with contract against Vinluan.  On April 12, 2007, the court denied the 
defendants motion to dismiss on procedural grounds.  Avalon Gardens v. Almendrala, Index No. 
021330/06 (Nassau Co. April 12, 2007), available at 
http://decisions.courts.state.ny.us/10jd/nassau/decisions/index/index_new/bucaria/2007apr/021330-
06.pdf (link).  It is not clear why a breach of contract action was not brought against all ten nurses. 
11
  Vinluan v. Dolye, No. 2008-02568, 2009 WL 93065 (N.Y. App. Div. Jan. 13, 2009) 
http://www.courts.state.ny.us/courts/ad2/calendar/webcal/decisions/2009/D20723.pdf (link).  The Ap-
pellate Division consolidated the nurses‘ case with Vinluan‘s.  As this Essay goes to press, it is unknown 
whether an appeal to the New York Court of Appeals will be sought.  
12
  29 U.S.C. §§ 151–69 (2006) (link). 
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through physical coercion.13  Additionally, the Supreme Court has long rec-
ognized that states cannot force specific performance of employment con-
tracts mandating a specified length of employment.  As the Court 
explained: 
Whatever of social value there may be, and of course it is great, in enforcing 
contracts and collection of debts, Congress has put it beyond debate that no in-
debtedness warrants a suspension of the right to be free from compulsory ser-
vice.  This congressional policy means that no state can make the quitting of 
work any component of a crime, or make criminal sanctions available for hold-
ing unwilling persons to labor.14 
Subsequent legislation enacted to enforce the Thirteenth Amendment 
outlawed the practice of ―peonage‖15—the ―status or condition of compul-
sory service, based upon the indebtedness of the peon to his master.‖16  
United States v. Mussry17 provides a modern day example of this horror.  
The defendants held poor, non-English speaking Indonesians as servants 
against their will by enticing them to travel to the United States, paying 
them very little, and withholding their passports and return airline tickets 
while requiring them to work off the transportation debt as servants.18 
In 1979, the New York Court of Appeals addressed the constitutionali-
ty of a local law, which made it a misdemeanor to abandon or intentionally 
fail to perform a home improvement contract.  The court found that this law 
violated the Thirteenth Amendment and that enforcement of this statute in-
volved unlawful peonage.  The statute essentially criminalized quitting 
one‘s job.19 
There is little question that attorney Vinluan‘s advice was correct in 
that the Thirteenth Amendment protected the nurses‘ right to quit.  Indeed, 
it is hornbook contract law that a breach of a personal service contract is not 
subject to the remedy of specific performance.20  Alternatively, compelling 
their labor by the threat of contractual sanction is a form of peonage and 
therefore unlawful.21 
The Appellate Division decision did not discuss personal service con-
tracts.  Instead, the court concluded that criminal prosecution was precluded 





  United States v. Kozminski, 487 U.S. 931, 944 (1988) (link). 
14
  Pollock v. Williams, 322 U.S. 4, 16 (1944); Baily v. Alabama, 219 U.S. 219, 245 (1911).   
15
  See United States v. Redovan, 656 F. Supp. 121, 128 (E.D. Pa. 1986).   
16
  Clyatt v. United States, 197 U.S. 207, 215–16 (1905). 
17
  726 F.2d 1448 (9th Cir. 1984). 
18
  Id. at 1451 (citing Baily v. Alabama, 219 U.S. 219, 241 (1911)). 
19
  People v. Lavender, 398 N.E.2d 530 (N.Y. 1979). 
20
  See, e.g., CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 1204 (2006).  Significantly, however, it has long been recog-
nized that a party that breaches a personal service contract can be liable for money damages.  Clyatt, 197 
U.S. at 215; Raley v. Jackson, No. 3:04-0977, 2007 WL 1725254 (M.D. Tenn. June 12, 2007). 
21
  See Clyatt, 197 U.S. at 215–16. 
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practical effect of exposing the nurses to criminal penalty for exercising 
their right to leave their employment at will.‖22 
However, the Thirteenth Amendment does not prohibit all forms of 
compelled labor.23  As recognized by Professor Michael H. LeRoy, there is 
a public service exception, which is part of the ancient common law doc-
trine of Trinoda Necessitas.24  Because the medical profession is arguably 
public service and involves health and safety, this public service exception 
is implicated. 
The Supreme Court recognized a public service exception in Butler v. 
Perry25 to uphold a Florida criminal statute, which mandated that men work 
six days a year on roads and bridges.  Looking to English common law, the 
Court reasoned: 
[U]nless restrained by some constitutional limitation, a State has the inherent 
power to require every able-bodied man within its jurisdiction to labor for a 
reasonable time on public roads near his residence without direct compensa-
tion.  This is a part of the duty which he owes the public.26 
The Court held that the Thirteenth Amendment did not introduce any ―nov-
el doctrine with respect to services always treated as exceptional, and cer-
tainly was not intended to interdict enforcement of those duties which 
individuals owe to the State.‖27  The Court recognized this public service 
exception as recently as 1988, by stating, ―the prohibition against involunta-
ry servitude does not prevent the State or Federal Governments from com-
pelling their citizens, by threat of criminal sanction, to perform civic 
duties.‖28 
Turning to the case at bar, it is very doubtful that the public service ex-
ception supports the criminal charges brought against the nurses.  The 
NLRA anticipates that a sudden cessation of work in the medical profession 
raises important health and safety issues.  In fact, the statute was amended 
in 1974 to add strike notice requirements for unionized employees of health 
care institutions—nursing homes, for example—but the statute does not 





  Vinluan v. Dolye, No. 2008-02568, slip op. at 9 (N.Y. App. Div. Jan. 13, 2009). 
23
  The constitutionality of forced labor turns, in large measure, on the nature and amount of work 
required.  Courts have rejected claims of involuntary servitude with respect to mandatory community 
service requirements for High School graduation, Immediato v. Rye Neck School Dist., 73 F.3d 454, 459 
(2d Cir. 1996), attorney pro bono work, United States  v. 30.64 Acres of Land, 795 F.2d 796, 800–01 
(9th Cir. 1986), military service, Selective Draft Law Cases, 245 U.S. 366, 390 (1918) and jury duty, 
Hurtado v. United States, 410 U.S. 578, 589 n.11 (1973). 
24
  Michael H. LeRoy, Complusory Labor in a National Emergency: Public Service or Involuntary 
Servitude? The Case of Crippled Ports?, 28 BERKELEY J. EMP & LAB. L. 331, 361 (2007) (discussing 
common law doctrine of Trinoda Necessitas and referring to it as a ―civic duty principle‖).  
25
  240 U.S. 328 (1916). 
26
  Id. at 330–31 (citing 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE COMMENTARIES *357).  
27
  Id. at 333. 
28
  United States v. Kozminski, 487 U.S. 931, 944 (1988).  
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stay on their jobs.29  Thus, the statute specifically anticipates that there may 
be work stoppages in health care institutions and provides the public with 
certain protections in the form of notice—at least in unionized facilities.  
These protections, however, do not include compelled labor or the crimina-
lization of resignation.  The NLRA as the statement of national policy and 
its lack of a provision authorizing criminal sanctions strongly suggests that 
the nurses‘ behavior—quitting en masse—should not be included in the 
public service exception to the Thirteenth Amendment. 
The Appellate Division correctly recognized the existence of a public 
service exception.  However, the court found it inapplicable because the 
nurses were engaged in private employment and because no real danger to 
patients existed because the nurses resigned after completing their shifts 
and their resignations thus left no shift uncovered.30 
II. THE RIGHT TO ENGAGE IN CONCERTED ACTIVITY AND LABOR LAW 
PREEMPTION 
This Essay next turns to a series of cases involving concerted activity 
and strikes in the health care field in order to examine whether criminal 
prosecution is preempted by federal labor law.  While discussing the issue 
of strikes and concerted activity may seem a bit awkward because the 
nurses resigned without striking, laws concerning concerted activity are vi-
tal to this discussion because, if the nurses had the right to strike without 
fear of any criminal penalty, then they also had the right to quit without any 
criminal penalty. 
A. Concerted Activity 
Section 7 of the NLRA provides that employees have the right to en-
gage in ―concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or oth-
er mutual aid or protection.‖31  This statutory right is not limited to 
employees who are members of unions.  In NLRB v. Washington Alumi-





  See 1 THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW 1052–57 (Patrick Hardin, John E. Higgins, Jr., Christopher 
T. Hexter & John T. Neighbours eds., 5th ed. 2006) [hereinafter LABOR LAW] (discussing notice re-
quirements).  The health care notice requirements only apply to unionized employees.  Walker Method-
ist Residence, 227 N.L.R.B. 1630 (1977). 
The fact that the nurses who quit were not in a union is immaterial because, while a strike in a 
unionized facility without proper notice is considered unprotected activity, see Minn. Licensed Practica 
Nurses Assoc. v. NLRB, 406 F.3d 1020, 1027 (8th Cir. 2005), the manner in which these unorganized 
nurses quit (en mass) was also unprotected activity under the NLRA.  See infra Part II.A (discussing dis-
tinction between protected and unprotected activity under the NLRA). 
30
  See Vinluan v. Dolye, No. 2008-02568, slip op. at 10–11 (N.Y. App. Div. Jan. 13, 2009). 
31
  29 U.S.C. § 157 (2006). 
32
  370 U.S. 9 (1962). 
NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW COLLOQUY  
http://www.law.northwestern.edu/lawreview/colloquy/2009/6/ 323 
discharging non-union employees who walked out without notice because 
the shop was too cold.33 
The Supreme Court recognized, however, that not every work stoppage 
is protected under Section 7: 
It is of course true that § 7 does not protect all concerted activities . . . .  The 
activities engaged in here do not fall within the normal categories of unpro-
tected concerted activities such as those that are unlawful, violent or in breach 
of contract.  Nor can they be brought under this Court‘s more recent pro-
nouncement which denied the protection of § 7 to activities characterized as 
‗indefensible‘ because they were found to show a disloyalty to the workers‘ 
employer . . . .34 
Employees who strike have a duty to take ―reasonable precautions to 
[prevent] . . . foreseeable imminent danger.‖35  In the health care setting, the 
National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) has recognized that ―patient wel-
fare and working conditions are often inextricably intertwined.‖36  Never-
theless, strikes at health care institutions involving heath care personnel are 
generally permissible.  For example, a two-hour walk out by employees in a 
catheterization lab in protest of working conditions at a hospital was found 
to be protected.37 
This protection, however, is not absolute.  A 2004 NLRB Division of 
Advice Memo concluded that unorganized recovery room nurses at an acute 
care hospital were not protected under Section 7 when they engaged in an 
unannounced sickout.  The nurses had failed to take reasonable precautions 
to prevent foreseeable damage as a result of their sudden cessation of 
work.38 
Under this standard, there seems to be little question that, in the Vin-
luan case, the nurses‘ decision to leave en mass was unprotected activity.  
The mass resignation could have caused harm and there were precautions 
the nurses could have taken to prevent that harm, such as resigning at dif-
ferent times.  Therefore, had the nurses not resigned and only walked out or 
struck, they could have been lawfully terminated.  
Significantly, however, a walkout or a strike would not have been un-
lawful;39 instead, the nurses‘ activity was simply not protected by the 





  See id. at 14–18. 
34
  Id. at 17 (internal citations omitted). 
35
  Bethany Med. Ctr., 328 N.L.R.B. 1094 (1999).  
36
  Valley Hospital Med. Ctr., Inc., 351 N.L.R.B. No. 88, slip op. at 4 (Dec. 28, 2007). 
37
  Bethany Med. Ctr., 328 N.L.R.B. 1094 (1999); see also Mercy Hospital Assoc., 235 N.L.R.B. 
681 (1978). 
38
  The Christ Hospital, 9-CA-40750, at 3–4 (Div. of Advice March 26, 2004), available at 
http://www.nlrb.gov/shared_files/Advice%20Memos/2004/9-CA-40750(03-26-04).pdf (link). 
39
  See National Packing Co. v. NLRB, 352 F.2d 482, 485 (10th Cir. 1965) (explaining that unpro-
tected activity is not unlawful unless it directly violates the NLRA); NLRB v. Coal Creek, 204 F.2d 579, 
582 (10th Cir. 1953) (stating that a walkout was unprotected but not unlawful). 
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making certain conduct ―unprotected‖ instead of ―unlawful‖ is important 
for determining whether prosecution of the nurses is preempted by the 
NLRA. 
B. Labor Law Preemption 
The defendants have asserted that their criminal prosecutions are 
preempted by the NLRA.  They have argued that they were engaged in pro-
tected concerted activity (quitting their jobs) under this statute.40  Though 
the nurses‘ en masse resignation was not protected under the NLRA, the 
nurses‘ criminal prosecution is preempted, but for reasons distinct from 
whether they engaged in protected activity.  
There are two primary forms of labor law preemption: Garmon 
preemption41 and Machinists preemption.42  In Garmon, the Supreme Court 
explained: 
When an activity is arguably subject to § 7 or § 8 of the Act, the States as well 
as the federal courts must defer to the exclusive competence of the National 
Labor Relations Board if the danger of state interference with national policy 
is to be averted.43 
Matters that are merely of a ―peripheral concern‖ to the NLRA are not 
preempted; however, an actual conflict with state law is not necessary.  A 
state regulation that ―potentially‖ conflicts with federal regulation is 
preempted.44 
Garmon preemption does not apply to activity that ―touche[s] interests 
so deeply rooted in local feelings and responsibility that, in the absence of 
compelling congressional direction, we could not infer that Congress had 
deprived the states of the power to Act.‖45  This local interest exception was 
founded upon the ―compelling state interest . . . in the maintenance of do-
mestic peace‖ and applies to ―conduct marked by violence and imminent 
threats to the public order.‖46  At least three circuits have held that the 





  See Article 78 Petition, supra note 4, ¶¶ 29–48.  
41
  See San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959). 
42
  See Lodge 76, Int‘l Ass‘n of Machinists v. Wis. Employment Relations Comm‘n, 427 U.S. 132 
(1976); see Chamber of Commerce v. Brown, 128 S. Ct. 2408 (2008) (discussing various forms of labor 
law preemption). 
43
  Garmon, 359 U.S. at 244–45; see also Marquez v. Screen Actors Guild, 525 U.S. 33 (1998) (reaf-
firming Garmon principles).  Under Garmon, it is not necessary for a actual charge to be filed alleging a 
violation of the NLRA.  See LABOR LAW, supra note 29, at 2357.  
44
  Garmon, 359 U.S. at 243–44, 246. 
45
  Id. at 243; see also Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. San Diego Dist. Council of Carpenters, 436 U.S. 
180, 194–97 (1978) (discussing local interest exception to preemption doctrine). 
46
  Garmon, 359 U.S. at 247. 
47
  United States v. Boffa, 688 F.2d 919 (3d Cir. 1982); United States v. Douglas, 398 F.3d 407 (6th 
Cir. 2005); United States v. Palumbo Bros., 145 F. 3d 850 (7th Cir. 1998). 
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tionally, several state courts have recognized that state criminal law is not 
preempted by federal labor law.48 
The nurses‘ actions were not protected under the NLRA, and matters 
of local concern are generally left to state criminal statutes.  Therefore, un-
der Garmon the state would not be preempted from criminally prosecuting 
the defendants.  
Machinists, however, should probably preempt the nurses‘ prosecu-
tions.  Under Machinists, the ―crucial inquiry [is] whether Congress in-
tended that the conduct be unregulated and left ‗to be controlled by the free 
play of economic forces.‘‖49  Machinists preemption recognizes a zone ―re-
served for market freedom‖; in other words, what Congress left unregulated 
is just as important as what is regulated.50  Machinists preemption does not 
apply, however, to conduct alleged to be ―physically injuring or threatening 
injury to persons or property.‖51  
For example, in Greater Boston Chamber of Commerce v. City of Bos-
ton,52 the district court held that a municipal ordinance that made it unlawful 
to hire replacement workers during a strike or a lockout was preempted un-
der Machinists.  The court reasoned that the conduct regulated under the or-
dinance was intentionally left unregulated by Congress. 
The nurses‘ case is strikingly similar to NLRB v. Lefkowitz,53 in which 
the Commissioner of Health issued an order prohibiting a strike during a 
dispute over nursing home Medicaid reimbursements.  The union chal-
lenged the order as preempted by the NLRA.  The district court held that a 
state may not prohibit or restrain employees in the hospitals and nursing 
homes from exercising their right to strike, noting that ―Congress intended 
to occupy[] this field and closed it to state regulation.‖54  Significantly, the 
court recognized that such a strike may seriously jeopardize public health 
and safety, but concluded that the NLRA supported the right to strike even 
when a strike might cut off essential public services. 
Thus, a strong argument can be made that the NLRA preempts the 
nurses‘ criminal prosecution because it upsets the balance of economic 
power, which was intended to be left unregulated.  On the other hand, an 
argument can be made against Machinists preemption because of the threat 





  See, e.g., State v. Klinakis, 425 S.E.2d 665, 669 (Ga. Ct. App. 1992); Gen. Elec. Co. v. Local 182 
Int‘l Union of Elec. Workers, 266 S.E.2d 750, 753 (N.C. Ct. App. 1980); Fansteel Metallurgical Corp. v. 
Lodge 66 of Amalgamated Ass‘n of Iron, Steel & Tin Workers of N. Am., 14 N.E.2d 991, 994–95 (Ill. 
App. Ct. 1938). 
49
  Lodge 76, Int‘l Ass‘n of Machinists v. Wis. Employment Relations Comm‘n, 427 U.S. 132, 140 
(1976). 
50
  Chamber of Commerce v. Brown, 128 S. Ct. 2408, 2412 (2008) 
51
  Lodge 76, Int’l Ass’n of Machinists, 427 at 151 n.13. 
52
  778 F. Supp. 95 (D. Mass. 1991). 
53
  NLRB v. New York, 436 F. Supp. 335 (E.D.N.Y. 1977). 
54
  Id. at 338 (quoting UAW v. O‘Brien, 339 U.S. 454, 457 (1950)).  
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On balance, the nurses‘ prosecution should be found to be preempted.  
Not only is the state, through criminal prosecutions, directly interfering 
with the nurses‘ fundamental right to quit, the NLRA specifically deals with 
the health and safety issues implicated by work stoppages in the health care 
industry.55  Congress chose to impose additional notice requirements in 
unionized facilities, but a violation of these notice requirements results only 
in a strike being unprotected.  Employees engaged in strikes without suffi-
cient notice are not participating in unlawful activity, but are simply not 
protected from termination under the NLRA.  Congress did not criminalize 
strikes in the unionized healthcare industry without notice.  The same result 
should apply where employees of non-union facilities, which are not even 
subject to additional notice requirements, quit.   
It is doubtful that this preemption defense would apply to attorney Vin-
luan because he was only acting as an attorney.  The preemption issue has 
become academic in this case, however, because the Appellate Division 
found that the conduct in question was not unlawful.  Although the labor 
law and preemption issue was briefed, the Appellate Division did not dis-
cuss it.   
III. THE LEGAL ISSUES SURROUNDING THE ATTORNEY WHO ADVISED 
THE NURSES 
A ―lawyer cannot advise (urge, suggest, propose, counsel, exhort) the 
client to break the law.‖56  In labor relations, attorneys often represent par-
ties at collective bargaining negotiations and direct companies‘ organized 
opposition to unionization.57  It should come as no surprise that such attor-
neys are often involved in—and sometimes even the cause of—unlawful ac-
tivity known as unfair labor practices.58  As a practical matter, lawyers that 
violate the NLRA have little to fear because bar associations generally only 





  See LABOR LAW, supra note 29, at 1052–57 (discussing notice requirements). 
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  RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN S. DZIENKOWSKI, THE LAWYER‘S DESK BOOK ON PROFESSIONAL 
RESPONSIBILITY § 1.2-4(A) (2008).  A lawyer also cannot purposely avoid ―knowing‖ a certain fact by 
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  Andrew J. Kahn, Problems of Professional Ethics in Labor Law, 1987 DET. C.L. REV. 731. 
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  Indeed, the problem of professional attorney ethics in labor relations has been well recognized. 
See, e.g., id.; Note, The Liability of Labor Relations Consultants for Advising Unfair Labor Practices, 
97 HARV. L. REV. 529 (1983).  As the Second Circuit stated: ―We note in this regard that ‗lawyer-
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837 F.2d 575, 579 (2d Cir. 1988). 
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  Kahn, supra note 57, at 747.  By way of example, an employer in Abbey’s Transportation Servic-
es was found to have violated the law because of the coercive effect of the attorney‘s interrogation of 
employees.  See 837 F.2d at 578–82.  Although the court found such conduct ―disturbing,‖ no action 
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luan‘s conduct, however, does not present this type of ethical violation be-
cause no violation of the NLRA occurred. 
Whether Vinluan, acting as a lawyer, committed a crime is a different 
question.  Professor Charles W. Wolfram asserts that most ―lawyer crimes‖ 
fall into one of two categories: the ―totally out-of-role lawyer crime‖ and 
the ―in-role-but clearly wrongful crime.‖  The former involves a street 
crime such as murder.  The latter involves lawyer activity that is clearly un-
lawful, such as filing a false affidavit or stealing funds from a client.  Ac-
cording to Wolfram, cases that fall into these categories are easy.60 
There is, however, a third category of cases in which lawyers can face 
criminal charges for advice they may have given to their clients.  These cas-
es are difficult and exceedingly rare.61  As an example, Professor Wolfram 
cites United States v. Cintolo,62 in which a lawyer was convicted of obstruc-
tion of justice because he advised his client to invoke his Fifth Amendment 
rights against self-incrimination despite government immunity and ap-
proved of his client being physically threatened if he testified against anoth-
er one of the attorney‘s clients.63 
The criminal indictment against the nurses and Vinluan alleges that 
Vinluan advised the nurses to resign en mass.  The conspiracy charge 
against Vinluan arises from this allegation and falls within the relatively 
rare third category of advice-based lawyer crimes.  However, even if Vin-
luan advised the nurses to quit en mass, which he denies, it is hard to see 
how he is in any way culpable—criminally or professionally—because the 
nurses‘ actions were not unlawful.  The fact that the State Education De-
partment did not seek to revoke the nurses‘ licenses supports that conclu-
sion.   
More fundamentally, the Appellate Division found that the criminal 
prosecution of Vinluan interfered with his First Amendment rights of ex-
pression and association.64  Specifically, the court found that as an attorney, 
Vinluan had a constitutional right to provide legal advice to his clients, and 
that prosecuting an attorney for providing legal advice is ―profoundly dis-
turbing‖ because it may chill other attorneys from acquainting clients with 
their legal rights.65   
Moreover, restrictions on an attorney‘s communication with his clients 





  Charles W. Wolfram, Lawyer Crimes: Beyond The Law?, 36 VAL. U. L. REV. 73, 79, 86–87 
(2001). 
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  See id. at 77, 91 (stating that there are not many reported decisions involving lawyer crimes 
committed while representing a criminal defendant). 
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  818 F.2d 980 (1st Cir. 1987). 
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  818 F.2d 980, 985–86 (1st Cir. 1987).  Professor Wolfram also cites to United States v. Cueto, 
151 F.3d 620 (7th Cir. 1998) as another example where a lawyer was convicted of obstruction of justice.  
Wolfram, supra note 60, at 92.   
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  Vinluan v. Dolye, No. 2008-02568, slip op. at 11 (N.Y. App. Div. Jan. 13, 2009). 
65
  Id. at 12. 
103:317 (2009) A Lawyer’s Worst Nightmare 
http://www.law.northwestern.edu/lawreview/colloquy/2009/6/ 328 
client‘s fundamental right to meaningful access to courts.66  Although it did 
not address this issue directly, the Appellate Division called the prosecution 
of Vinluan ―an assault on the adversarial system of justice upon which our 
society, governed by the rule of law rather than individuals, depends.‖67  
Thus, in prosecuting criminal charges against Vinluan, the District Attorney 
has acted inappropriately. 
CONCLUSION 
An ironic aspect of this case is that one of the nurses‘ chief reasons for 
consulting with Vinluan was likely the $25,000 liquidated damages provi-
sion in their employment contracts—a provision which was probably an 
unenforceable penalty clause.68  Damages are considered a penalty when 
they are ―plainly or grossly disproportionate to the probable loss.‖69   
The liquidated damages provision in the nurses‘ contracts would al-
most certainly be found to be a penalty—the contract even used the word 
―penalty‖ in the liquidated damage section.  The dollar amount appears to 
have been designed to prevent the nurses from leaving their employ and 
does not appear to have any reasonable relationship to the loss.  Moreover, 
the $25,000 liquidated damage figure is identical in each employment con-
tract.  It defies logic that the company‘s damages and expenses were the 
same for each of the nurses. 
At the end of the day, while it is not difficult to understand why the 
nurses quit (they were unhappy with their jobs), it is difficult to understand 
why they decided to quit en mass.  Did they intend to purposely inflict 
harm?  Did they want to send a message to the employer not to sue under 
the liquidated damage clause because the nurses all stand together?  Did 
they have some other reason?  Regardless of their motivation, the nurses 
had the right to quit.   
While the nurses‘ concerted activity was not protected under the 
NLRA, and they could have been fired had they not quit, their actions were 
not unlawful.  At most, the nurses could be sued for actual damages for 
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New York state law provides some basis for alleging that the nurses‘ beha-
vior was unlawful, criminal prosecution of the nurses should be preempted 
by the NLRA because it interferes with the free play of economic forces in 
an area of law that was intended to be left unregulated. 
Additionally, the nurses‘ attorney should never have been prosecuted.  
Even if he advised the nurses to quit en mass, which he denies, he did not 
violate the law by advising them to do so; the nurses had a right to quit.  
Moreover, the First Amendment protects Vinluan‘s right as an attorney to 
render good faith legal advice, even if—unlike Vinluan‘s advice in this 
case—that advice ultimately proved incorrect.  The Appellate Division got 
it right by recognizing that the chilling effect resulting from the prosecution 
of an attorney for providing legal advice amounted to ―an assault‖ on our 
system of justice. 
This Essay does not aim to minimize the potential harm caused by a 
group of health care professionals quitting en mass.  From a public policy 
perspective, however, this harm should not be redressed through criminal 
prosecutions; it should be redressed through professional licensure proceed-
ings.  In New York, the State Education Department regulates the nursing 
profession.  The fact that the state chose not to invoke such proceedings 
should not give the District Attorney cart blanche to second-guess the Edu-
cation Department‘s decision by invoking criminal law. 
